Gianpaolo Callioni

Xavier de Montgros

Regine Slagmulder

Luk N. Van Wassenhove

Linda Wright

A década de 1990 foi difícil para o negócio de PCs. Embora a demanda tenha crescido cinco vezes entre 1990 e 1997, os produtos haviam se tornado produtos básicos para o lar e era difícil para as empresas diferenciarem suas ofertas.

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Reprint: R0503J 

In the 1990s, Hewlett-Packard&#8217;s PC business was struggling to turn a dollar, despite the company&#8217;s success in winning market share. By 1997, margins on its PCs were as thin as a silicon wafer, and some product lines hadn&#8217;t turned a profit since 1993.
The problem had everything to do with the PC industry&#8217;s notoriously short product cycles and brutal product and component price deflation. A common rule of thumb was that the value of a fully assembled PC decreased 1% a week. In such an environment, inventory costs become critical. But not just the inventory costs companies traditionally track, HP found, after a thorough review of the problem. The standard &#8220;holding cost of inventory&#8221;&#8212;the capital and physical costs of inventory&#8212;accounted for only about 10% of HP&#8217;s inventory costs. The greater risks, it turned out, resided in four other, essentially hidden costs, which stemmed from mismatches between demand and supply:
Component devaluation costs for components still held in production;
Price protection costs incurred when product prices drop on the goods distributors still have on their shelves;
Product return costs that have to be absorbed when distributors return and receive refunds on overstock items, and;
Obsolescence costs for products still unsold when new models are introduced.
By developing metrics to track those costs in a consistent way throughout the PC division, HP has found it can manage its supply chains with much more sophistication. Gone are the days of across-the-board measures such as, &#8220;Everyone must cut inventories by 20% by the end of the year,&#8221; which usually resulted in a flurry of cookie-cutter lean production and just-in-time initiatives. Now, each product group is free to choose the supply chain configuration that best suits its needs. Other companies can follow HP&#8217;s example.

Inventory-Driven Costs

Reimpressão: R0503J Na década de 1990, o negócio de PCs da Hewlett-Packard estava lutando para ganhar um dólar, apesar do sucesso da empresa em conquistar participação de mercado. Em 1997, as margens de seus PCs eram tão pequenas quanto uma pastilha de silício, e algumas linhas de produtos não geravam lucro desde 1993. O problema tinha tudo a ver com os ciclos de produtos notoriamente curtos do setor de PCs e com a brutal deflação dos preços de produtos e componentes. Uma regra prática comum era que o valor de um PC totalmente montado diminuía 1% por semana. Nesse ambiente, os custos de estoque se tornam críticos. Mas não apenas os custos de estoque que as empresas tradicionalmente monitoram, descobriu a HP, após uma análise completa do problema. O “custo de manutenção do estoque” padrão — os custos físicos e de capital do estoque — representou apenas cerca de 10% dos custos de estoque da HP. Os maiores riscos, ao que parece, residiam em outros quatro custos essencialmente ocultos, decorrentes de incompatibilidades entre demanda e oferta: Custos de desvalorização de componentes para componentes ainda em produção; Custos de proteção de preços incorridos quando os preços dos produtos caem nos produtos que os distribuidores ainda têm em suas prateleiras; Custos de devolução do produto que devem ser absorvidos quando os distribuidores retornam e recebem reembolsos sobre itens com excesso de estoque, e; Custos de obsolescência para produtos ainda não vendidos quando novos modelos são introduzidos. Ao desenvolver métricas para monitorar esses custos de forma consistente em toda a divisão de PCs, a HP descobriu que pode gerenciar suas cadeias de suprimentos com muito mais sofisticação. Já se foram os dias de medidas generalizadas, como “Todos devem reduzir os estoques em 20% até o final do ano”, o que geralmente resultava em uma enxurrada de produção enxuta padronizada e iniciativas just-in-time. Agora, cada grupo de produtos tem a liberdade de escolher a configuração da cadeia de suprimentos que melhor atenda às suas necessidades. Outras empresas podem seguir o exemplo da HP.

Custos baseados em invent&aacute;rio

Reprint: R0503J In the 1990s, Hewlett-Packard’s PC business was struggling to turn a dollar, despite the company’s success in winning market share. By 1997, margins on its PCs were as thin as a silicon wafer, and some product lines hadn’t turned a profit since 1993. The problem had everything to do with the PC industry’s notoriously short product cycles and brutal product and component price deflation. A common rule of thumb was that the value of a fully assembled PC decreased 1% a week. In such an environment, inventory costs become critical. But not just the inventory costs companies traditionally track, HP found, after a thorough review of the problem. The standard “holding cost of inventory”—the capital and physical costs of inventory—accounted for only about 10% of HP’s inventory costs. The greater risks, it turned out, resided in four other, essentially hidden costs, which stemmed from mismatches between demand and supply: Component devaluation costs for components still held in production; Price protection costs incurred when product prices drop on the goods distributors still have on their shelves; Product return costs that have to be absorbed when distributors return and receive refunds on overstock items, and; Obsolescence costs for products still unsold when new models are introduced. By developing metrics to track those costs in a consistent way throughout the PC division, HP has found it can manage its supply chains with much more sophistication. Gone are the days of across-the-board measures such as, “Everyone must cut inventories by 20% by the end of the year,” which usually resulted in a flurry of cookie-cutter lean production and just-in-time initiatives. Now, each product group is free to choose the supply chain configuration that best suits its needs. Other companies can follow HP’s example.

Custos baseados em inventário

Resumo.

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