Web Exclusive: How the UK’s Royal Marines Plan in the Face of Uncertainty

20 March 2003: The first wave of coalition helicopters carrying Royal Marines from 42 Commando and the elite Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) flew across the night sky from their base in Kuwait to support their fellow Marines of 40 Commando, who had landed on Iraq’s Al Faw peninsula from the sea and were securing strategic oil and gas installations there. Moving low and fast through dust and haze, with no moon or stars to guide them, the lead formation quickly reached the waypoint en route to Iraq. Suddenly, one of the helicopters nose-dived. Unable to recover at the low altitude, it flew straight into the desert sand at 100 knots, instantly killing its four crew members and eight passengers. The victims included the BRF commander and people on his staff. The remaining helicopters were recalled to base and the troops offloaded. Given a pressing flight schedule, the coalition air commander had to divert his helicopters to the next mission, grounding the Royal Marines of 42 Commando and BRF. Within four hours, 3 Commando Brigade headquarters had put in place a new command structure for the BRF and had obtained replacement transport from the UK’s Royal Air Force. The RAF pilots, who had not been part of the original invasion plans, had arrived in Kuwait only hours before. They were quickly briefed, troops were loaded, and the assault by 42 Commando and BRF continued. Agility in the face of unexpected adversity has helped make the Royal Marines one of the world’s most successful fighting forces—and it’s a skill that business leaders would do well to emulate. Recent events, ranging from the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico to volcanic eruptions in Iceland to the global banking crisis, underline how vulnerable companies are to unexpected shocks. Yet for all that volatility, many corporations treat the world as a predictable place and view strategic decision making as the domain of a privileged few at the top. The Royal Marines operate very differently (see the exhibit “Royal Marines Command Structure” for a simplified look at their hierarchy). For them, the unexpected is the norm. As the UK’s amphibious commandos, they don’t always know what they will find on land when they arrive from the sea, yet they have to achieve their mission regardless of the conditions and the means available. They must be prepared to change their plans when disruptive events render their original ones obsolete. So, it is essential that each Marine can fall back on common procedures—and can rely on his colleagues to do the same—in response to the unforeseen. Click here for a larger image of the graphic. The Seven Questions For the Royal Marines, planning a mission is about more than just proposing a sequence of actions and allocating resources. It is also about shaping strategic thinking, developing a shared understanding of the necessary outcomes for success, and figuring out how to transform the current state into the desired state while allowing for improvisation on the ground. The act of planning matters more than the plan itself. To accomplish all that, the Royal Marines use a relatively simple, widely applied military planning technique called the Seven Questions. All Marines—from the generals leading thousands of troops to the corporals leading sections of eight to 10 men—are trained in it and employ it, which means they all approach and analyze their missions in the same way. They develop a working understanding of the situation and their mission by answering the first three of the seven questions, and then they draw up a plan by answering the remaining four. Planners revisit the questions as events unfold, to see if they need to change or even abort the mission. Let’s look at how the Royal Marine Brigade planners carried this process out as they put together a mission plan for the assault on Al Faw. 1. What Is the Situation on the Ground, and How Does It Affect Me? To answer this question, which was kept under review throughout the operation, the Brigade commander and his core planning group of senior officers sought data on the enemy and the local population in relation to the mission. An intelligence officer gathered information on the enemy’s capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and possible courses of action from reconnaissance forces on the ground, surveillance aircraft, and other sources. A “human terrain” officer drew on intelligence databases and informants’ insights to shed light on the people in the area—on their culture and economy, social networks, and possible attitudes toward the mission as a result of previous missions and outcomes they’d witnessed. An engineering officer obtained weather forecasts and anticipated effects on ground conditions for both the enemy and the Marine forces. Other subject matter experts at Brigade headquarters gathered intelligence in their areas of responsibility, as well, and assessed how it might affect the mission. Subsequently, the Brigade commander and his staff received reports painting a coherent picture of the context in which the mission would be executed. Any important gaps were filled with explicit assumptions, to be verified or discredited as new information came in. Though everyone recognized that better information would yield better decisions, the objective was to produce a good enough sense of the situation on the ground rather than invest too much time in chasing perfection. 2. What Have I Been Told to Do and Why? The Brigade commander and his staff asked themselves this question to make sure they knew exactly what needed to be achieved, when, and why, and which key areas to monitor. Answering it is always a four-step process: First, analyze the “commander’s intent.” That’s the statement from the very top describing the purpose behind the mission. A unit commander has to understand the thinking of his commander “two up” in the hierarchy—the leader of the whole operation—and then reconcile it with the intent of his immediate commander in order to fully grasp his own part in the overall plan. For instance, a major leading one of 40 Commando’s four companies would have needed to get a clear sense of his Brigade commander’s intent (Secure the Al Faw peninsula in order to protect the oil and gas infrastructure vital for Iraq’s postwar reconstruction) to suss out his own role in the plan prepared by 40 Commando’s commanding officer (Secure and protect oil pipeline terminals A and B in order to allow future production). Understanding intent at both levels enables the Marines to attain goals even when unexpected events overtake plans. It aligns behaviors and actions, without micromanagement. In general, a superior commander’s orders will not detail how a unit is to achieve its specific mission. That’s left to subordinate commanders to decide. Second, identify the implied tasks by examining those that are specified. In the Al Faw case, the Brigade planners determined that an assault by sea or surface required reconnaissance of the routes into the region, clearance of beaches, and use of helicopters and other vehicles to land the Marines—all of which implied the need for logistical support. The Marines would also have to liaise with civilian oil and gas engineers to learn the layout and functioning of the oil-processing sites that 40 Commando was to secure. This analysis provided a clear view of the required tasks and outcomes—but again, the “how” was left to the Brigade commander to figure out later in the process. Third, understand operating constraints—such as time, space, resources, and rules of engagement—outlined by higher command. For example, a higher commander may specify in the Brigade commander’s orders: “Avoid collateral damage of nonmilitary infrastructure to expedite subsequent stabilization and reconstruction efforts.” Fourth, take a step back (now and periodically going forward) to ask whether the situation has changed. If it has, the commander’s intent is no longer valid; it’s pointless to continue with the original order. 3. What Effects Do I Want to Have, and What Direction Must I Give? Having developed a good understanding of the situation, mission, tasks, and constraints his superiors have outlined, the Brigade commander must now make clear his own intent: What are the effects he wants to have on the situation, the purpose of each effect, and the ways he’ll measure progress? He also needs to highlight his top priority to help staff members focus their efforts when considering solutions and resources. In general, the less time there is available for planning and decision making, the more direction the commander will need to provide at this stage. It may even be helpful to outline a solution based on his experience. Commanders typically articulate their desired effects through verb-object constructions—for example, they might say, “Secure and protect oil pipeline terminals A and B.” They use strong action verbs such as “secure,” “protect,” “find,” “inform,” and “pursue”—drawn from a shared lexicon so all Marines will know exactly what is meant. Commanders also express themselves graphically, through the “intent schematic,” a map of the desired effects and relative priorities. Leaders at all levels need to remember that the commanders and Marines below them will have to refer to their statements—just as they themselves must refer to those issued from the top. In other words, statements of intent are really mandates for action for the various parties charged with carrying out the mission; clear language will ensure that everyone has the same understanding. For example, in the Al Faw operation, one effect desired by the Brigade commander was securing the oil and gas installations in order to prevent their destruction by Iraqi forces—the main effort assigned to 40 Commando. Another one, blocking the area northwest of the oil and gas installations to prevent enemy interference with 40 Commando’s objectives, was the task of 42 Commando and BRF. And securing the Iraqi port town of Umm Qasr to enable the landing of humanitarian aid was the job of 15 Marine Expeditionary Unit, an element of the United States Marine Corps under the command of the Brigade during the invasion. 4. Where and How Can I Best Accomplish Each Action or Effect? With all this input in hand, the Brigade’s planning staff commenced the second stage of the process by answering the fourth question, which involved developing possible courses of action (COA) for the commander to consider. There may be occasions when only one COA is possible, but it is generally preferable to have two, three, or more alternatives: This leads to the identification of more issues that need to be considered and options the commanders can choose from later. This phase of the process is where the planning teams really come into their own, creating innovative solutions with whatever resources are immediately available. This takes time, so it is most efficient to have a separate planning team dedicated to each course of action, enabling concurrent activity. Being multiskilled further allows the Royal Marines to achieve more in the limited time available. As their perspective is Marine first, specialist second, specialist contributions to the mission are seen from the grassroots view of the Marine on the ground—where the commander’s plan is turned into reality. In generating COAs, planning teams take into account risk factors identified earlier, including the second- and third-order consequences of actions to achieve effects. The planners have three choices regarding each risk: ensure that it does not become an issue by addressing its cause directly; fold it into the main plan; or, if it is a showstopper, develop a contingency plan. For example, contamination of aviation fuel could have halted 40 Commando’s initial helicopter assault on Al Faw from the sea. Brigade headquarters monitored the fuel quality and secured backup fuel stocks in case contamination occurred. In contrast, the possibility of sandstorms had to be incorporated into the main plan. That is, the plan needed to have three “branch” options for assault: by air, by sea, or by land, because helicopters can’t fly in sandstorms. If, however, the situation on the ground would at the last minute (after takeoff) prevent 42 Commando and BRF from landing safely from the air, they would employ their contingency plan: return to Kuwait and drive instead. 5. What Resources Do I Need to Accomplish Each Action or Effect? Courses of action submitted for a commander’s consideration must be feasible. Those that cannot be supported are simply a waste of planning effort. Identifying tasks in response to the second question (“What have I been told to do and why?”) and putting together the intent schematic (the prioritization of desired effects) will help the planning staff allocate resources and assets to the most important effects first, which puts a price tag on each course of action and facilitates decision making. For instance, in planning the Al Faw operation, the Brigade commander intended to land 40 Commando from the sea and send 42 Commando from Kuwait for support. Ideally, both units would have conducted the assault in helicopters, but the Brigade owned only enough for 40 Commando, the lead unit. Because the UK government had not yet committed Royal Air Force resources to the effort, Brigade planners had to attempt to obtain additional helicopters from other coalition partners or consider alternative transport. Accordingly, a number of COAs were prepared, covering the full range of options. 6. When and Where Do the Actions Take Place Relative to Each Other? Shock, surprise, and reserves are crucial to winning battles. By massing maximum relative power at a decisive place and time, you can upend the opponent’s expectations and thwart his ability to act. To accomplish that, you typically need to create a “scheme of maneuver” to synchronize efforts within the chosen course of action. This involves constructing a timetable that shows the relationships between activities (both enemy and friendly) and lists the key functions and decision points en route to the mission’s desired end state. As a case in point, the Iraqis were made to believe through earlier deception that the U.S.-led coalition would invade from the west. So, the Royal Marines saw that a night assault from the south, on the Al Faw peninsula, would come as a surprise. To enable this, they reconnoitered; cleared obstacles and mines from the Al Faw beaches; and prepositioned troops, ships, helicopters, vehicles, and supplies in Kuwait and the Gulf. They placed artillery on Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island to fire at Iraqi positions around the oil and gas installations before the aviation assault by 40 Commando. This artillery fire had to stop before the helicopters landed. The timetable for the Al Faw plan ensured that people, equipment, and stores would be in the right places at the right times and that the right tasks would be conducted in the right order. It also highlighted events (such as sandstorms) that would trigger particular branch plans, contingency plans, or other actions. 7. What Control Measures Do I Need? Given the potential for rapid change in the operating environment, a good military plan is never rigid. Rather, it should be like a movie script that has an underlying logic but provides alternative endings for each scene and arms the actors with the freedom to improvise. To maintain headquarters’ ability to coordinate and manage what was happening on the ground while empowering people to react in real time, the Brigade commander defined guiding principles and control measures for his own plan. These allowed the units under him to understand the boundaries of their actions and decisions as well as their relationships with others when unexpected events occurred. The control measures needed to be aligned with those of higher commanders. For example, 40 Commando’s assault met with far less resistance than expected, and it achieved its objectives ahead of time. The next phase of the plan called for the unit to move north, toward Basra. Although this move also, eventually, happened ahead of schedule, the unit’s commanding officer did not have the authority to proceed until 40 Commando was resupplied and 42 Commando and BRF were ready to move north as well. Cascading the Process In a complex, ambiguous, and fast-evolving operation, every commander from the top down must be involved in the mission-planning process and apply the same technique. To set a coherent timetable for all this planning, the Royal Marines adhere to a one-third/two-thirds rule: They calculate the amount of time between their receipt of orders from a higher formation and the point at which their own formation needs to be ready for the operation. They then allow themselves one-third of that time to plan and deliver orders to subordinate commanders, who in turn take one-third of the remaining time for developing their plans and orders. This process is repeated down to the troop level, where planning basically means physically preparing to carry out the mission’s tasks. When possible, planners “bank” time. If they answer one of the Seven Questions ahead of deadline, they move right to the next question, increasing the amount of time available later on. If the schedule is tight, they may conduct some planning concurrently rather than sequentially. To expedite the process, they issue warning orders at various points. For example, when Brigade headquarters receives a mission from a higher formation, a first warning order is immediately pushed down, unfiltered, to the lowest level, stating what the Brigade is being told to do, when, and why. Any available intelligence is also shared at that time, and requests for information are addressed then and throughout the operation. After planners answer the third question (“What effects do I want to have, and what direction must I give?”), the commander’s intent, along with the intent schematic, cascades down in a second warning order, providing Royal Marines lower in the ranks with more direction and an understanding of their commander’s thinking. Similarly, when the commander has chosen his course of action upon planners’ completion of questions four through seven, a third warning order states how the desired effects are to be achieved, enabling the Royal Marines to focus their preparations even more. Planners issue warning orders at the commando and company levels as well, thereby ensuring that everyone throughout the organization has the same understanding of what needs to happen and why. As we pointed out above, one of the key lessons from the Royal Marines’ planning is that the process matters more than the plan itself. Further, it is an inclusive process, drawing on the insights, skills, and qualities of people at every level. This approach requires mutual trust and respect for the contributions of others, instilled through collective training that imparts a strong sense of common identity. Corporations are a lot like the Royal Marines: Managers on the ground floor turn senior executives’ big ideas into reality, so they need to understand their leaders’ intent, be empowered to contribute to its achievement, and get involved in the planning. Conversely, corporate leaders must learn to trust their people just as Royal Marine commanders trust those below them—even when subordinates make decisions that differ from their own.

Web Exclusive: How the UK’s Royal Marines Plan in the Face of Uncertainty

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