Justin Fox

Jay W. Lorsch

Os acionistas reclamam, com justificativa, de executivos que embolsam salários incríveis enquanto entregam resultados medíocres. Os conselhos estão presos no meio, sob crescente pressão para atuarem como vigilantes e disciplinadores, apesar das evidências de que são mais eficazes como conselheiros amigáveis.

izdsYNsjCUvHlB9BYhmCO0JA5N+G8WriqS1kXT0MgPGrtsx+tXlW5y/r+LuaABE7BCkM/go8PRh75Ly2cMM6aGMyIX5GTDeK4GzCGfNKFJfDN8i6aa8M9nwOR7+W8HA5

Reprint: R1207B 
Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle&#8212;under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they&#8217;re more effective as friendly advisers. Over many years shareholders have gained power but been frustrated by the results. Could the problem lie with them? Perhaps they aren&#8217;t really suited to being corporate bosses. 
Their role, write the authors, has been to provide money, information, and discipline. But established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. Furthermore, high-frequency traders now account for as much as 70% of daily volume on the NYSE. As for information, shareholders communicate through stock prices&#8212;but human nature dictates that we pay more attention to simple recent signals than to complex long-run trends. And shareholders have only two major disciplinary tools at their disposal: selling their shares and casting their votes. But institutional investors, which own the lion&#8217;s share of stock and have widely diversified portfolios, find it difficult to focus on the governance and performance of any one company. 
Fixing corporate governance, the authors conclude, must be about finding roles for other actors in the corporate equation who can assume some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially discipline.

What Good Are Shareholders?

Reimpressão: R1207B Executivos reclamam, com justificativa, que a intromissão e a dúvida dos acionistas estão tornando cada vez mais difícil para eles fazerem seu trabalho de forma eficaz. Os acionistas reclamam, com justificativa, de executivos que embolsam salários incríveis enquanto entregam resultados medíocres. Os conselhos estão presos no meio, sob crescente pressão para atuarem como vigilantes e disciplinadores, apesar das evidências de que são mais eficazes como conselheiros amigáveis. Ao longo de muitos anos, os acionistas ganharam poder, mas ficaram frustrados com os resultados. O problema poderia estar com eles? Talvez eles não sejam realmente adequados para serem chefes corporativos. Seu papel, escrevem os autores, tem sido fornecer dinheiro, informação e disciplina. Mas corporações estabelecidas tendem a financiar investimentos com lucros acumulados ou dinheiro emprestado. Além disso, os negociadores de alta frequência agora respondem por até 70% do volume diário na NYSE. Quanto às informações, os acionistas se comunicam por meio dos preços das ações, mas a natureza humana determina que prestemos mais atenção aos sinais recentes simples do que às tendências complexas de longo prazo. E os acionistas têm apenas duas grandes ferramentas disciplinares à sua disposição: vender suas ações e votar. Mas os investidores institucionais, que possuem a maior parte das ações e têm portfólios amplamente diversificados, têm dificuldade em se concentrar na governança e no desempenho de qualquer empresa. Fixar a governança corporativa, concluem os autores, deve ser encontrar papéis para outros atores na equação corporativa que possam assumir parte do ônus de fornecer dinheiro, informações e, especialmente, disciplina.

Para que servem os acionistas?

Reprint: R1207B Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle—under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they’re more effective as friendly advisers. Over many years shareholders have gained power but been frustrated by the results. Could the problem lie with them? Perhaps they aren’t really suited to being corporate bosses. Their role, write the authors, has been to provide money, information, and discipline. But established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. Furthermore, high-frequency traders now account for as much as 70% of daily volume on the NYSE. As for information, shareholders communicate through stock prices—but human nature dictates that we pay more attention to simple recent signals than to complex long-run trends. And shareholders have only two major disciplinary tools at their disposal: selling their shares and casting their votes. But institutional investors, which own the lion’s share of stock and have widely diversified portfolios, find it difficult to focus on the governance and performance of any one company. Fixing corporate governance, the authors conclude, must be about finding roles for other actors in the corporate equation who can assume some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially discipline.

Para que servem os acionistas?

Resumo.

Partner Center